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LABOR LAW
REFUSAL TO CROSS STRANGER PICKET LINE NOT
ENJOINABLE UNDER Boys Markets EXCEPTION

Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers
With the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 1 in 1932,
Congress inaugurated a federal labor policy permitting and
encouraging complete freedom of union organization. 2 In an
attempt to protect the nascent labor movement from the abuses of
federal judicial intervention, 3 section 4 of the Act severely
circumscribed the authority of the federal courts to issue
injunctions in cases arising out of labor disputes. 4 As labor organi29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
2 In § 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress described the public policy that inspired
the statute's enactment as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is
commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor . . . it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing ....
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
3 From the very beginning of the labor movement, federal courts were a frequent ally of
management in its disputes with employees. Indeed, they often intervened in employeremployee contests in an attempt to curtail the growth of labor organizations. To this end, the
courts resorted to combinations of the criminal conspiracy doctrine, the illegal purpose
doctrine, the unlawful means test, antitrust laws, and most importantly, the labor injunction.
For a discussion of these methods and their effect upon the early labor movement, see W.
OBERER & K. HANSLOWE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
A FREE SOCIETY 85-87 (1972) [hereinafter cited as OBERER & HANSLOWE].
4 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment ....
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was the legislative response to widespread abhorrence of the
labor injunction. Primarily, the concern was that the grant or denial of an injunction did not
relate to the merits of the underlying social or economic dispute, which, it was agreed, the
courts were powerless to remedy. The granting of an injunction in a labor dispute has been
graphically described as "tying the lid on a boiling kettle of water and stuffing a rag down its
spout." OBERER & HANSLOWE, supra note 3, at 87. Further objections to the labor injunction
concerned the employment of the temporary restraining order, which was usually requested
when proceedings for an injunction were commenced. Although the court issued the restraining order ex parte, having only heard the employer's side of the dispute, it would
remain binding until both sides appeared at the hearing on the employer's petition for a
temporary injunction. Once a strike was halted by the ex parte order, moreover, it often
could not be revived. Indeed, the injunction process itself led to protracted delays of the
hearings on the merits. For a summary of the criticisms leveled at the labor injunction, see A.
Cox & D. BOK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 70-76 (7th ed. 1969). See generally F.
FRANKFURTER & N.

GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); C. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE

LAW 83-200 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
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zations grew in strength, however, it became necessary to equalize
the competing economic forces of labor and management. 5 Congressional emphasis therefore shifted to the encouragement of
collective bargaining and the promotion of peaceful settlement of
labor disputes through arbitration. 6 To that end, Congress enacted7
section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA),
giving federal courts jurisdiction to enforce agreements to
arbitrate.8 Since this shift occurred without revision of the NorrisThe first legislative attempt to curb the use of the injunction in labor disputes, § 20 of
the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), failed due to the Supreme Court's restrictive
interpretation of the statute's scope in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921). The framers of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, aware of their previous abortive effort,
attempted to leave no loopholes for subsequent judicial interpretation. See OBERER & HANSLOWE, supra note 3, at 85-86. See also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36
(1941). As a result, § 13 defines "labor dispute" in sweeping terms, thereby severely limiting
the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions in such cases:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions
of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970). For a discussion of the legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, see Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. REV. 638 (1932).
Between 1935 and 1947, labor unions grew rapidly with the aid and encouragement of
the federal government. In 1935, only 3 million workers belonged to labor unions. By 1947,
this number had increased to 15 million and the labor movement had gained tremendous
power. See Preface to S. SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS at v (1947); id.
at 1-28.
6To promote stable and harmonious working relations between employer and employee, Congress has encouraged recognition of collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 17-18 (1947). Complete effectuation of this federal policy
is achieved when the agreement contains both a mandatory arbitration provision and a
prohibition of strikes. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,453 (1957).
7 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
1 Relying on legislative history which indicated that § 301(a) was intended by Congress
"to provide the necessary legal remedies," the Supreme Court has found the purpose of this
provision to be more than merely jurisdictional. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 455 (1957), citing "93 CONG. REc. 3656-57 (1947) (exchange between Representatives Barden and Hartley). To the unions, this meant that they could obtain specific performance of an employer's promise to arbitrate grievances. See Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458-59 (1957). See generally Vladeck, Boys Markets and
National Labor Policy, 24 VAND. L. REV. 93, 95 (1970). Furthermore, to ensure maximum
utilization of the arbitral process, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized its
importance by creating a presumption in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960). Specifically, the Court has declared:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
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LaGuardia Act, 9 harmonizing the anti-injunction terms of NorrisLaGuardia with the proarbitration policy of section 301(a) of the
LMRA was left to the judiciary. 0
The Supreme Court, in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770,11 accommodated these conflicting federal policies by creating
a narrow exception to the Norrig-LaGuardia bar to injunctive relief. In Boys Markets, the Court held that a strike may be enjoined if
it arises as a reaction to a grievance which the parties, under the
terms of an effective collective bargaining agreement containing a
no-strike provision, are contractually obligated to submit to arbitration. 12 Ascertaining the intended scope of this exception, however,
With respect to employers, the Court has noted that since a no-strike obligation on the
part of labor is "the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance
disputes to the process of arbitration," Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 248 (1970), the basic purposc of arbitration would be largely undercut if the
no-strike obligation could not be readily and quickly enforced. Id. at 249. Indeed, a no-strike
obligation may be implied. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95,
104-06 (1962), wherein the Court stated that the existence of an agreement pursuant to
which certain disputes will be exclusively covered by mandatory arbitration gives rise to an
implied promise by the union not to strike in response to these arbitrable issues. Accord,
Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974). See generally Marshall,
Federal Enforcement of a No-Strike Clause by Injunctive Relief, in SyMpos .NI ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 566, 571-72 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961).
,Compare Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, §§ 1 et seq., 47 Stat. 70 with 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et
seq. (1970). Congress has steadfastly refused to repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
See also id. at 251.
" Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970). Notwithstanding the strong policy in favor of arbitration, see notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra, courts
were without authority, under § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, to award injunctive relief to
employers seeking to enforce no-strike provisions in collective bargaining agreements. See
note 4 supra. This presented a serious obstacle to employers because nonirijunctive remedies,
i.e. suing for damages or firing employees, frequently proved unsatisfactory. See generally
Anderson, The Right to Strike and the Arbitration Clause, N.Y.U. 23d CONF. ON LABOR 225,
227-28 (1970); Note, Labor Injunctious, Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrabiliy, 85
HARV. L. REV. 636, 638 (1972); 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 190, 192 n.16 (1973).
For examples of attempts to reconcile the Norris-LaGuardia Act with other statutes, see
Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 63 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa.
1945), rev'd on other grounds, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act), and
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957) (Railway Labor
Act).
11398 U.S. 235 (1970).
In Boys Markets, the dispute concerned whether particular work was to be performed
by union members rather than nonunion supervisory personnel. The union insisted that
only its members could rearrange merchandise in the frozen food cases of the employer's
market and demanded that the shelves stocked by the nonunion employees be unloaded.
When the employer refused, the union went on strike. The dispute was subject to arbitration
under the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, and the strike was a clear
violation of an express no-strike clause in that agreement. Id. at 238-40. In affirming the
district court's order enjoining the strike, the Court overruled Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195 (1962). There, the Court had held that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
prohibited a federal district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike clause even
though the collective bargaining agreement contained binding arbitration provisions
enforceable under § 301(a) of the LMRA. Justice Brennan, writing for the Boys Marke5
majority, reasoned that the Sinclair decision seriously undermined the effectiveness of
arbitration since "employers will be wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate specifically
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has been a particularly vexing problem for the circuit courts. Specifically, much controversy has arisen over whether a union's
refusal to cross another union's lawful picket line constitutes an
arbitrable dispute with the primary employer sufficient to invoke
the Boys Markets exception. The Second Circuit recently had
occasion to deal with this rather "narrow but significant question of
labor law"' 3 in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers. 1 4 There, the
court determined that where union members strike "solely out of
deference to another union's lawful picket line," 5 and not because
of a desire to avoid arbitration, the strike is not over a grievance
which the union had agreed to arbitrate. 16 Since the Boys Markets
exception is therefore inapplicable, the court held that section 4 of
17
the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes an award of injunctive relief.
The defendants in Buffalo Forge, the United Steelworkers of
America and two of its locals (production unions), represented,
under successive collective bargaining contracts, the production
and maintenance employees of Buffalo Forge Company, a
manufacturing and sales operation owning three plants and offices
in or nearby Buffalo, New York. The same international union,
with two other locals (technical unions), also represented the
company's technical and clerical employees. While negotiating their
first collective bargaining agreement, the technical unions struck
the company and established picket lines at all of the Buffalo area
enforceable against them when no similarly efficacious remedy is available to enforce the
concomitant undertaking of the union to refrain from striking." 398 U.S. at 252. The Court
further reasoned that the central purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not be
frustrated "by a remedial device that merely enforces the obligation that the union freely
undertook under a specifically enforceable agreement to submit disputes to arbitration." Id.
at 252-53 (footnote omitted). See also ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1963 PROCEEDINGS, Report of Special Atkinson-Sinclair Connittee 226, 242 (1964).
The Boys Markets Court adopted the principles suggested by Justice Brennan in his
dissenting opinion in Sinclair as guidelines for the district courts in determining whether
injunctive relief is appropriate:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive relief
against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an
injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is
sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order
until it first holds that the contract does have that effect . ...
398 U.S. at 254 (emphasis in original), quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195,
228 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the Boys Markets Court specifically noted that its holding was a narrow one and that the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was not to be thereby undermined. Nor was injunctive relief to be "appropriate as a
matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance." 398 U.S. at 253-54.
13 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
96 S. Ct. 214 (1975).
14517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 214 (1975), aff'g 386 F. Supp. 405
(W.D.N.Y. 1974).
'1 517 F.2d at 1208 (emphasis in original).
6
Id. at 1210.
17 Id.at 1211.
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facilities. Thereafter, production and maintenance employees at
one of the plants refused to cross the technical unions' picket line
and engaged in a 1-day work stoppage. Three days later, the
production unions called a work stoppage at all of the plants,
thereby halting completely the company's manufacturing operations.1 8
The company, seeking damages and injunctive relief, brought
suit in the federal district court. Plaintiff contended that the nostrike provision of the collective bargaining agreement 9 prohibited
the defendant production unions from refusing to cross the
technical unions' picket lines. It further argued that a Boys Markets
injunction should issue since the parties were required to settle
their differences by means of the mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the agreement. 20 Refusing to extend
the narrow Boys Markets exception to the facts in Buffalo Forge, the
district court ruled that injunctive relief was barred under section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The court reasoned that it was the
strike of technical and clerical employees which had "preceded and
precipitated the work stoppage of the defendant Locals." '2 1 The
underlying dispute, therefore, was between the plaintiff and the
striking members of the technical unions, not between the
company and the defendant production unions, the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement. 22 The court concluded that to
hold that the legality of the very strike sought to be enjoined
constituted an arbitrable dispute would, by enabling federal courts
to issue injunctions as a matter of course, "undermine the vitality of
the anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," 23 a
386 F. Supp. at 407.
z The no-strike provision provided in pertinent part:
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of work. No
Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid or condone
any such activities. No employee shall participate in any such activity.
ld.
20 The adjustment of grievances
provision provided in pertinent part:
Should differences arise between the Company and any employee covered by this
Agreement as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement,
or should any trouble of any kind arise in the plant, there shall be no suspension of
work on account of such differences . ...
Id The plaintiff further contended that the production unions' work stoppage was due to a
dispute over a work assignment. Nevertheless, once the district court rejected this claim as
unsupported by the evidence, id. at 407-09, the plaintiff did not raise the issue on appeal.
517 F.2d at 1211 n.7.
21 386 F. Supp. at 410.
"

22

Id.

Id., quoting Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373-74 (5th
Cir. 1972).
23

1975]

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1974 TERM

result specifically denounced in the Boys Markets decision. 24
Convinced that the impact of Boys Markets had been correctly
construed, the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the decision
of the district court.2 5 Judge Smith, writing for the panel, stressed
the significance of the accommodation process utilized by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets. 2 6 That narrow exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia proscription of judicial intervention, it should be
remembered, had been carved out to protect the arbitration ma27
chinery established by the collective bargaining agreement.
Consequently, the Boys Markets decision should not be considered
authority for enjoining "[a] strike not seeking to pressure the employer to yield on a disputed issue" which the parties had -agreed to
resolve within the arbitration procedures. 28 In deciding the applicability of the Boys Markets exception, therefore, the Buffalo Forge
court held the crucial determination to be whether the strike was
over a grievance which the union had agreed to arbitrate. The
panel was persuaded, however, that the strike in issue was not over
a grievance with the employer at all, but merely a manifestation of
the production unions' deference to the picket lines of other employees. 29 Accordingly, the court concluded that its denial of
injunctive relief would give full effect to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
without violating the federal proarbitration policy implicit in
30
section 301(a) of the LMRA.
Although Boys Markets is of relatively recent origin, there are a
number of cases involving its application to facts similar to those
presented in Buffalo Forge. Essentially, these decisions present two
distinctly different views of the proper construction and
application of Boys Markets.3 1 The Second Circuit has elected to
21 See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970), discussed in
note 12 supra.
25 517 F.2d at 1211. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Kaufman and Judges Smith
and 26
Timbers.
Id. at 1211. For a discussion of the Boys Markets rationale, see notes 11-12 and
accompanying text supra.
27See 398 U.S. at 252-53.
28517 F.2d at 1211.
29
1d. at 1210.
3
'1d. at 1211. The defendant had also argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to
injunctive relief because it did not comply with § 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §
108 (1970), which mandates that every reasonable effort be made to settle the dispute by
negotiation. The Second Circuit did not reach the merits of this contention, however, since it
agreed with the basis upon which the district court denied injunctive relief. 517 F.2d at 1209
n.4.
31 Primarily, the conflict exists between the approach of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth
Circuits and that of the Fourth. See notes 32-41 and accompanying text infra. The Seventh
Circuit has yet to affirmatively declare its position on this issue. Although its most recent
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follow the Fifth Circuit's decision in Arnstar Co~p. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 32 the leading case for the proposition that a refusal to
cross a stranger picket line is not enjoinable.
In Amstar, the court determined that the refusal of union
members to cross a picket line established at their place of employment by another union was not a strike "over a grievance"
which the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. 3 3 In the
court's opinion, the work stoppage, rather than being over, or a
reaction to, a grievance, had actually precipitated the dispute, the
dispute being whether the union's no-strike obligation precluded
member-employees from honoring stranger picket lines. Thus, the
court concluded, the case fell outside the scope of the Boys Markets
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the district court was
without jurisdiction to issue an injunction. 34 In essence, the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning was that if the legality of the very strike sought
to be enjoined were held to constitute an arbitrable dispute
sufficient to justify the grant of a Boys Markets injunction, virtually
every strike would be enjoinable. Such a reading of the narrow Boys
Market exception would, according to the court, undermine the
35
viability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The Fourth Circuit, however, adopted the contrary point of
view in Monongahela Power Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 2332.36
Presented with facts almost identical to those of Amstar, the
Monongahela court ruled that the legality, pursuant to a no-strike
provision of a collective bargaining agreement, of a union's refusal
to cross a stranger picket line is a dispute clearly subject to mandatory arbitration under the agreement. 37 The court reasoned that a
collective bargaining agreement prohibiting employees from
decision appears to indicate that it considers itself more closely aligned with the majority, its
approach does vary. See note 39 iifra.
32 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
33
1d. at 1373.
31 Id. at 1373-74. Accord, Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Clevelantl Typographical Local
53, 88 L.R.R.M. 2155 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd per curiam, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975);
Carnation Co. v. Teamsters Local 949, 86 L.R.R.M. 3012 (S.D. Tex. 1974). The same theory
was succinctly set forth in General Cable Corp. v. Electrical Workers Local 1644, 331 F.
Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1971), wherein the court stated:
The only grievance or dispute between the Company and Local 1644 is the result of
the strike and not the cause of the strike. It does not come within the narrow
exception created by the rule in Boys Market [sic] to the applicability of the NorrisLaGuardia Act.
Id. at 482. Accord, Simplex Wire & Cable Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 2208, 314 F. Supp.
885 (D.N.H. 1970) (mem.); f. Parade Publications, Inc. v. Philadelphia Mailers Local 14,459
F.2d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 1972).
3. 468 F.2d at 1373-74.
36484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
37
1d. at 1214.
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participating in any strike, and requiring any grievance involving a
claimed violation of its provisions to be resolved through arbitration, 38 mandates that a dispute regarding the legality of a work
stoppage be submitted to arbitration. 39 The claimed violation of the
no-strike provision, therefore, was thought to be "a grievance
which both parties [were] contractually bound to arbitrate"40 within
"1Id. at 1213. With respect to the settlement of grievances, the collective bargaining
agreement in Monongahela provided:
Any dispute between the Company or employees covered by this Agreement with
respect to the interpretation, application, or claimed violation of any express
provision of this Agreement shall constitute a grievance which shall be settled in
accordance with the provisions of this Article.
Id. at 1210 (emphasis added by court). With respect to union strikes, it further provided:
No employee shall participate in any such strike, work stoppage, slowdown or any
other interference with or impeding of work and the Union will not authorize,
instigate, aid or condone any such activity.
Id. (emphasis added by court).
'91d. at 1214. Although it was expressly noted that the Monongahela decision was
distinguishable on its facts, the Seventh Circuit took a similar approach in Inland Steel Co. v.
UMW Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974). The Inland Steel court held that a dispute
concerning Local 1545's right, under its collective bargaining agreement, to engage in a
sympathy strike was arbitrable within the scope of the agreement's broad arbitration
provisions. The agreement in question had provided that differences over the meaning and
application of its provisions as well as differences not specifically mentioned and "any local
trouble of any kind" were ultimately to be resolved through arbitration procedures. Id. at
297 n.5. Having determined that the defendant's work stoppage certainly constituted "local
trouble of any kind," the court implied an obligation not to strike over that arbitrable
dispute. Id. at 299-300. In other words, the court reached the somewhat implausible result of
implying an obligation not to strike over a preexisting strike. The court thus concluded it
had established the proper prerequisites for allowing the district court to issue a Boys Markets
injunction. Id. Hence, although the Monongahela decision involved an express no-strike
clause, both decisions predicated a Boys Markets injunction primarily on a determination that
the legality of the very work stoppage sought to be enjoined was an issue to be resolved
through arbitration procedures.
The Inland Steel court, by refusing to express an opinion on the Amstar-Monongahela
conflict, id. at 299, left the Seventh Circuit's position on this issue somewhat uncertain.
Subsequent cases from that circuit involving express no-strike clauses, moreover, did little to
crystalize its stand. In Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 96 S.Ct. 269 (1975), the court did not enjoin a union's refusal to cross another local's
picket line, finding such refusal not to be an arbitrable dispute. The court distinguished
Inland Steel by noting that that decision rested upon an exceptionally broad arbitration
clause, whereas the clause in Gary Hobart merely provided for arbitration of "any and all
disputes arising under or in connection with [the agreement]." 511 F.2d at 287-88. The Gary
Hobart court did not refer to either Amstar or Monongahela, but apparently accepted the
approach of Inland Steel that the resolution of the issue of the work stoppage's arbitrability
was the crucial determination.
Again focusing on whether the work stoppage was arbitrable under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement, the court in Hyster Co. v. Independent Towing Mach.
Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir.), petitionforcert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3253 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No.
75-524), disallowed the issuance of a Boys Markets injunction in a stranger picket line
situation. The Hyster court found the language of the arbitration clause in this case to more
closely resemble the language of the Gary Hobart provision than that ofInland Steel 519 F.2d
at 91-92. Interestingly, the court at this juncture made abstruse references to the Amstar
decision and in footnotes apparently declared itself to be in accord therewith. Compare id. at
92 & n.3 w'ith id. at 91 & n.2. Arguably, therefore, while the Seventh Circuit's approach
resembles, in spirit, the Monongahela view, the trend of its decisions indicates future holdings
more in keeping with Amstar.
40484 F.2d at 1214.
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the meaning of the Boys Markets exception. Hence, injunctive relief
to prevent the union from refusing to cross another union's picket
line was considered proper.
In addition, it should be noted that other decisions have
allowed the issuance of injunctions in such picket line situations.
These cases may be distinguished, however, since the injunctions
were predicated on explicit language in the collective bargaining
agreement pursuant to which the unions specifically reserved to
42
themselves the right to refuse to cross stranger picket lines.
"' Id. at 1213. Accord, Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 150 (1975); Barnard College v. Transport Workers Union,
372 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 442
F.2d 251 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
42 See, e.g., NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321
(3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). In NAPA, members of the local union
in Pittsburgh refused to cross picket lines set up by another union. The collective bargaining
agreement required the settlement, by arbitration, of "any and all grievances, complaints or
disputes arising between the employer and the union." 502 F.2d at 323. Although the
agreement also contained a no-strike provision, another clause provided:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement... in the event an employee refuses to
enter upon any property involved in a primary labor dispute or refuses to go
through or work behind any primary picket lines . . .at the Employer's [NAPA
Pittsburgh's] place or places of business.
Id. at 322 (addition by court). A dispute arose as to whether the picket line which the union
had refused to cross was in fact "primary." Id. The court concluded that the issue of whether
the picket line should be classified as primary or secondary was an arbitrable dispute under
the terms of the contract and therefore a Boys Markets injunction was appropriate. Id. at 324.
Accord, Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen's Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (whether picket line is bona fide is arbitrable issue).
See generally Comment, Boys Market: Developments in the Third Circuit, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 281,
304-10 (1975). In making this determination, the NAPA court relied on the presumption in
favor of arbitration. 502 F.2d at 323, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). Application of the presumption in a Boys Market
situation has been criticized, however, since, as one commentator has noted, it may lead to
"an indiscriminate use of the injunctive power by federal courts ....
" Note, Labor Injunctions,
Boys Markets, and the Presumption of Arbitrability, 85 HARV. L. REV. 636, 639 (1972).
At least one court has characterized the decision in NAPA as anomalous. In Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 560, 373 F. Supp. 19 (D.N.J. 1974), the court, referring to
the district court holding in NAPA, stated:
When coupled with Amstar, Nappa [sic] stands for the proposition that the refusal to
cross a picket line cannot be enjoined even if the contract contains an arbitration
clause and a no-strike pledge; but if the contract also contains an express reservation, preserving the right to refrainfrom crossinga picket line, then the court may compel
the union members to cross the picket line.
When coupled with Monongahela, Nappa [sic] is similarly anomalous in that it
stands for the proposition that an arbitration provision and a no-strike pledge, in
absence of a reservation to honor the picket line of others, waives the right of union
members to refrain from crossing other union's picket lines, and therefore such
refusal to cross may be enjoined; but if the union seeks to reserve that right by way
of an express contractual provision, then the refusal to cross may still be enjoined
since the right not to cross is embodied in the contract and thereby becomes an
arbitrable issue.
Id. at 26-27 (emphasis in original). For further criticism of the court's holding in NAPA, see
88 HARV. L. REv. 463 (1974). Although the New Jersey district court in Pilot Freight
disagreed with the Pennsylvania district court's holding in NAPA, it noted that if NAPA were
subsequently affirmed by the Third Circuit, it would, of course, be bound by it. 373 F. Supp.
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It is clear that the lack of uniformity in the circuits arises out of
differing views of the applicability of the Boys Markets exception.4 3
In this regard, it would seem that the line of reasoning advanced
by Amstar, and strengthened in Buffalo Forge, is more closely
attuned than that of Monongahela to the spirit of the Supreme
Court's decision in Boys Markets. The Boys Markets Court explicitly
limited the propriety of granting an injunction to the situation
where the work stoppage is "over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate . . . . 44 As recognized by the
Amstar and Buffalo Forge couffs, this language appears to dictate
that before the Boys Markets exception can be operative a threshold
determination must be made that the arbitrable grievance between
the parties precipitated the work stoppage. 45 The Monongahela
court, however, finding an arbitrable dispute, namely, the legality
of the very strike sought to be enjoined, apparently ignored the
absence of a grievance between the parties which preceded and in
fact caused the strike.4 6
at 27. NAPA was so affirmed. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926,
502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974), aff'g 363 F. Supp. 54
(W.D. Pa. 1973). Although the Pilot Freight decision no longer has precedential value, its
rationale is nonetheless illustrative of the effect of the conflicting judicial views of the Amstar
and Monongahela courts upon the resolution of conflicts involving collective bargaining
agreements containing such an express contractual provision.
4 The uncertain state of the law is demonstrated by the fact that within a week of each
other, two district courts, in different circuits, reached conflicting conclusions on the same
facts. Compare Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 391, 375 F. Supp. 1254
(M.D.N.C.), modified sub nom. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1974) uith Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 560, 373 F.
Supp. 19 (D.N.J. 1974). The plaintiff in both cases, Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., is an
interstate common carrier of freight. Teamsters Local 512 went on strike against Pilot in
Jacksonville, Florida, and in an attempt to gain recognition by Pilot at its operation in
Florida, Local 512 established picket lines at Pilot's operations in other states. Among others,
Local 560 in Moonachie, New Jersey and Local 391 in Kernersville, North Carolina refused
to cross the picket lines. Pilot brought suit in the two district courts to enjoin the strikes of
both locals. The collective bargaining agreement in each case was identical. The New Jersey
district court, relying on Amstar, refused to enjoin Local 560 from continuing to honor Local
512's picket line. The district court in North Carolina, however, relying on Monongahela,
granted injunctive relief.
44 398 U.S. at 254, quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962)
Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
41See Amstar v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2d Cir. 1975). See also note
34 supra. The Boys Markets decision has been characterized by Amstar as having
established three prerequisites to jurisdiction in a federal district court to enjoin a
strike: (1) the strike must be in breach of a no-strike obligation under an effective
collective bargaining agreement, (2) the strike must be "over" an arbitrable grievance, and (3) both parties must be contractually bound to arbitrate the underling
grievance which caused the strike.
468 F.2d at 1373 (emphasis added).
" See 484 F.2d at 1213-14. The Monongahela court, having found that the work stoppage
resulting from the refusal to cross the picket lines violated the collective bargaining agreement, held that the strike was "a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to
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Even assuming the presence of a sufficiently arbitrable
underlying dispute, undue expansion of the narrow Boys Markets
holding should be discouraged in light of the Court's caveat that
injunctive relief is not appropriate "as a matter of course in every
case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance. ' 47 The very language
of the decision, moreover, necessarily limits the situation in which
an injunction may properly be granted to a particular set of facts. 48
The Boys Markets dispute was unmistakably one the union had
consented to resolve through arbitration. The union not only
ignored both its no-strike commitment and its agreement to arbitrate, but deliberately struck to pressure the employer into yielding
before the disputed issue could be brought to arbitration. 49 Such a
strike surely undermines the public policy favoring the peaceful
resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. Just as clearly, the
issuance of an injunction in such a situation fosters that policy,
although it necessarily conflicts with the prohibition of injunctions
contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Faced with this conflict, the
Supreme Court chose to create a narrow exception to the NorrisLaGuardia Act so that a union may be prevented from engaging in
conduct "plainly designed to circumvent and defeat its explicit
agreement to arbitrate." 50
In cases involving a refusal to cross a stranger picket line, no
such motive to elude arbitration exists. The strike is not the result
of a dispute over the union's right to engage in such a work
stoppage, but of the union's deference to the presence of another
union's picket line. 5 1 The end of the walkout cannot be obtained by
the employer's concession that the union in fact has the right to
arbitrate" and therefore enjoinable under the Boys Markets decision. Id. at 1214. It is
submitted, however, that a careful reading of Boys Markets indicates that injunctive relief is
only proper if the strike to be enjoined is "'over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate'" 398 U.S. at 254, quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Noticeably absent from the
language of the Monongahela court's holding was the qualifying word "over." This omission
highlights the court's apparent disregard of the necessary causal relationship between the
arbitrable grievance and the strike.
47 398 U.S. at 253-54.
41The facts of Boys Markets are set forth in note 12 supra.
4'See 398 U.S. at 254; NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502
F.2d 321, 325 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Hunter, J. & Seitz, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1049 (1974).
50NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 325-26
(3d Cir.) (en banc) (Hunter, J. & Seitz, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
' But .see
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Drivers Local 500, 363 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D. Pa.
1973), where the court found the union's refusal to cross a stranger picket line not to have
been motivated by deference to the other union. Rather, the evidence established that the
defendant local had used the picket line as a shield for its own attempts to force the
employer to resolve other arbitrable disputes. Id. at 1256. Consequently, the injunction was
issued. Id. at 1259.
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engage in the work stoppage. This can only be achieved by a
resolution of the dispute with the other union and removal of the
picket lines. As the union's work stoppage is therefore not intended
to force settlement of an arbitrable issue before arbitration can take
place, the denial of injunctive relief would not undermine the labor
policy that favors the arbitration of disputes. 52 Granting the
injunction, on the other hand, would frustrate the intent of the
anti-injunction provision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act since the
issuance of an injunction under these circumstances would make it
"difficult to conceive of any strike which could not be so
enjoined" 53 and thus "permit the narrow exception ... to subsume
the rule. '54 This is particularly true since a no-strike provision,
even if not in fact present in the collective bargaining agreement,
will be implied where the agreement sets up mandatory arbitration
55
procedures.
The exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act carved out by the
Boys Markets Court may represent the 'judiciary's most ambitious
foray into an area seemingly pre-empted by statute. '5 6 Absent a
more definitive statement from the Supreme Court, or subsequent
modification of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by Congress,5 7 that
52 Id.; see Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. Thacker & Cannery Warehousemen Local 788, 394
F. Supp. 715, 718 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
13 Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373 (5th Cir. 1972),
quoted in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207, 1211 (1975).
51 Inland Steel Co. v. UMW Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293, 301 (7th Cir. 1974) (Fairchild, J,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Accord, Wilmington Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen's Local
1426, 86 L.R.R.M. 2846, 2847 (4th Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022
(1974); Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Local 53, 88 L.R.R.M. 2155,
2160 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd per curiam, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975); Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 560, 373 F. Supp. 1.9, 23 (D.N.J. 1974).
55 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962). At least one
commentator has argued that the no-strike clause should not be implied in a Boys Markets
situation. See Note, The New FederalLau, of Labor Injunction, 79 YALE L.J. 1593, 1600 (1970).
The author contends that since the absence of a no-strike clause generally indicates that such
a provision has been rejected, its implication in an injunction situation subordinates both
freedom of contract and the Norris-LaGuardia Act to industrial peace through arbitration.
36 NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321, 334 (3d
Cir.) (en banc) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974). See Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255-61 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); Note, The
Nen Federal Lan' of Labor Injunctions, 79 YALE L.J. 1593, 1598-99 (1970); note 57 infra.
57 The legislative history of § 30 1(a) of the LMRA clearly demonstrates that Congress
considered and affirmatively rejected exempting § 301(a) actions from the operation of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203-08 (1962),
overruled, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). The House
version of the LMRA, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(e) (1947), authorized
injunctions against breaches of collective bargaining agreements. This proposal was
eliminated, however, in conference. H.R. Misc. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66
(1947). The Supreme Court, in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), therefore
refused to make Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable by judicial fiat, but invited Congress to act if
public policy demanded otherwise. The Court stated:
Strong arguments are made to us that it is highly desirable that the Norris-

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

exception should not be expanded. 5 Since certiorari has been
granted, the opportunity now exists for the Supreme Court to
approve the conclusion reached in Buffalo Forge. As the Second
Circuit noted, its decision comports "with the Supreme Court's
direction to district courts ... to reconcile [section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act and section 301(a) of the LMRA] rather than
59
simplistically read a repeal of § 4 into the later enactment.
James McIntyre
LaGuardia Act be changed in the public interest. If that is so, Congress itself might
see fit to change that law and repeal the anti-injunction provisions of the Act insofar
as suits for violation of collective agreements are concerned, as the House bill under
consideration originally provided.... The question of what change, if any, should
be made in the existing law is one of legislative policy properly within the exclusive
domain of Congress-it is a question for lawmakers, not law interpreters.
Id. at 214-15. In agreement with the court's position that this issue required congressional
resolution, several commentators maintained Sinclair should not be reversed. See Dunau,
Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REV. 427, 464-65 (1969); Wellington & Albert,
Statutoiy Interpretationand the PoliticalProcess:A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J.
1547, 1565-66 (1963). The Supreme Court did of course reverse its earlier Sinclair decision
in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Quite arguably, this is
as far as the Supreme Court desires to relax the anti-injunction policy of the NorrisLaGuardia Act.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Sinclair, moreover, a bill was proposed in
Congress which would have amended § 301 of the LMRA to permit parties to collective
bargaining agreements to secure for themselves an exemption from the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. S. 2132, H.R. 9059, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
The bill proposed the addition of the following subsection:
The provisions of the [Norris-LaGuardia Act] shall be inapplicable in any
proceeding to enjoin the violation of, or to enforce an arbitration award arising out
of an alleged violation of [a labor contract], if the contract includes (i) a provision
for submission to binding arbitration of any claim asserted by such labor organization alleging a violation of such contract by such employer, and (ii) a provision
expressly stating that the provisions [of the Norris-LaGuardia Act] shall be inapplicable in any such proceeding.
Id. Again, Congress refused to effect a change in this area of the law.
51 As one judge has stated:
Further modifications in the field of labor law may be in order, but this is a task that
must devolve upon the legislature, for in the face of a clear Congressional
command it is in the halls of Congress, not the corridors of courthouses, that the
changed emphasis in public policy is to be transfigured into new law.
Pilot Freight, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 560, 373 F. Supp. 19, 28 (D.N.J. 1974) (Stern, J.). In
contrast, in Comment, Sister Union Strikes and "No Strike" Clauses: The Logic and Necessity of a
Presumption of Inclusivity, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1044 (1974), the author advocates a broad
interpretation of the Boys Markets decision which would allow for the presumption that
"sister union strikes are prohibited [in a collective bargaining agreement]. unless the right to
honor them is specifically reserved." Id. at 1059. Interestingly, the Third Circuit, in NAPA
Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974), has since enjoined a union's refusal to cross a stranger picket
line notwithstanding its explicit reservation of the right to so refuse in the collective bargaining agreement. See note 42 supra.
59517 F.2d at 1211.

